The onset of large-scale biofuel production has helped lead to a structural change in agricultural markets, tightening the linkages between agricultural and energy commodities. The USA and EU have aggressive mandates in place, which could further strengthen the linkages. The imposition of such mandates reduces the susceptibility of agricultural markets to energy volatility; but increases the supply-side impacts. Feedstock-specific mandates insulate the US biofuels from low oil prices; however, EU biofuel use remains linked with oil prices through aggregate fuel use. Overall, US markets are more vulnerable than the EU to supply-side shocks due to their product-specific mandates.
Introduction
The onset of large-scale biofuel production has altered agricultural markets by inducing a structural change in the use of traditional feedstocks. This change has added an additional component to the tradeoffs between food and feed, and has tightened the linkages between agricultural and energy commodities. Early biofuel research focused on production, price and trade impacts, as well as potential land-use/greenhouse gas impacts. Recently, a large body of work has targeted better understanding of the energy-agricultural commodity price relationship. This literature has tended to focus on the role of high (and volatile) oil 1 prices and concludes that the large-scale use of traditional feedstocks for energy production has altered the agricultural landscape, with energy price volatility potentially playing a much larger role in agricultural commodity price volatility.
Traditionally, energy and energy-intensive inputs such as fertiliser have played a large role in the production of agricultural products. USDA (2011) estimates indicate that energy inputs accounted for almost 30 per cent of the total cost of corn production for the USA in 2008 (due largely to a tripling in fertiliser prices), up from 19.6 per cent during the 1996-2000 period. Biofuel policies and favourable market conditions have created an additional linkage between the energy and agricultural markets -this time from the output side. The amount of feedstocks utilised for biofuel production has increased tremendously in both the USA and EU (Table 1) . For the USA, about a third of total corn production is now used to produce ethanol. The EU has also seen that the share of feedstocks utilised for total biofuel production increases from 13.7 per cent in 2006 to 20.0 per cent in 2009.
Many countries have stated or expressed interest in promoting future biofuel use (see Table R12 in REN21, 2010) . However, the US and EU policies are the most aggressive and play the largest role in global agricultural markets. Therefore, these two regions are the focus of our paper.
The US biofuel policy is guided by the provisions set out in the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007. This act creates quantitative biofuel targets in the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) totalling 136.3 billion litres of ethanol equivalent fuel by 2022. Of that, a maximum of 56.8 billion litres can come from corn, and 3.8 billion litres is biodiesel (these levels are to be reached by 2015). The remaining 75.7 billion litres is in the form of advanced biofuels 2 (this includes , sugarcane-based ethanol and cellulosic ethanol). Since advanced biofuels are not yet economically viable and most of the mandated quantities so far have been waived because of lack of production, we focus solely on first-generation (corn-based ethanol and biodiesel) biofuels/ targets.
In the EU, there is the stated goal that 10 per cent of transportation fuels shall be derived from renewable sources by 2020 (REN21, 2010). However, unlike the USA, the EU Renewable Energy Directive (RED) does not specify what fuels must be utilised. Some member countries have defined their biofuel goals more stringently. For example, Germany plans to cover 8 per cent of its 2015 transportation fuels from biofuels and France has a 10 per cent target for 2015. The EU directive 4 requires that the lifecycle (net) greenhouse gas emissions of biofuels consumed should be at least 50 per cent less than the equivalent emissions from gasoline or diesel by 2017. For our purposes, we make no assumptions regarding the current or future technologies to meet the emission requirements.
In this paper, we develop a framework specifically designed for analysing how energy price volatility is likely to be transmitted to agricultural commodities in the future, and how changes in energy policy regimes affect the inherent volatility of commodity prices in response to traditional supply-side shocks. Towards this end, we employ a combination of theoretical, econometric and general equilibrium simulation analyses.
Literature review
The growing linkages between energy and agricultural commodities have received increasing attention by researchers. Tyner and Taheripour (2008) used a stochastic partial equilibrium (PE) model designed for the US economy to investigate the linkage between the energy and agricultural markets. They noted that agricultural commodity prices will be tied to oil prices in the future and that energy policies have the potential to affect the link between these markets. Hertel and Beckman (2010) illustrated how the increased sales of corn to ethanol production in the USA lead to a strengthened output linkage effect between energy prices and corn prices.
A report by the EU Commission (2009) pointed out that the prices of major agricultural commodities have grown increasingly volatile. For example, in the case of wheat, they dissected price volatility into four time-periods since 1980, identifying the period since 2006 as one of the increased ethanol will be competitive with advanced biofuels in the present time horizon and at least 56.8 billion litres will be produced. 3 Biodiesel in the USA is both present in the first-generation portion of the RFS and the advanced specification because the Environmental Protection Agency ruled that the current soy-based biodiesel qualifies as an advanced biofuel as it meets the emission requirement. For our purposes, we only consider the first-generation portion. 4 The US RFS also makes a similar requirement.
volatilities. The results from their work imply that if feedstocks are utilised in large amounts for biofuel production; price linkages with oil prices would likely be closely linked.
Both public policies and oil prices have played important roles in stimulating biofuel production. Hertel, Tyner and Birur (2010) concluded that higher oil prices accounted for about two-thirds of the growth in US ethanol output over the [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] period with the remainder being driven by the replacement of the banned gasoline additive, MTBE, with ethanol. In the EU, they estimated that rising oil prices accounted for about 40 per cent of biofuel expansion, with the majority of growth being driven by subsidies. Abbott, Hurt and Tyner (2009) estimated that about three-quarters of the 2007-2008 run-up in US corn prices was due to higher oil prices and one-quarter due to subsidies.
Almost all research examining agricultural commodity and energy price linkages have focused on the USA, due to the abrupt reallocation of agricultural feedstocks for fuel usage. Many of these studies have utilised time-series econometric techniques, in particular co-integration, to test the joint movement of energy and agricultural commodity prices. For example, Harri, Nalley and Hudson (2009) concluded that oil prices are linked to corn, cotton and soybean prices, but not wheat. The time series analysis of Serra et al. (2010a) suggested the existence of a long-term equilibrium relationship between ethanol, corn and oil prices in the USA, with ethanol deviating from this equilibrium in the short term (they work with daily data from 2005 to 2007). The authors found that a 10 per cent rise in the price of oil leads to a 10 per cent rise in ethanol, as one might expect of products they deem as perfect substitutes in use (perhaps an overly strong assumption in this case since it implies assuming away any demand bottlenecks and assuming not only the existence but the prevalence of flex-fuel vehicles and E-85 in the USA).
In a similar study, Serra et al. (2010b) concluded that Brazilian ethanol prices respond relatively quickly to sugar price changes, but more slowly to oil prices. A shift in either of these prices has a very short run impact on ethanol price volatility as well. Within one year, most of the adjustment to long-run equilibrium in both markets has occurred. However, it takes nearly 2 years for the full effect of an oil price shock to be reflected in ethanol prices. Overall, these commodity markets are not as quick to regain long-run equilibrium as those in the USA.
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Based on this evidence, it appears that, where it exists, the close link between agricultural and energy commodity prices is a relatively recent phenomenon; however, econometric investigations of price transmission suffer from the absence of sufficiently long time-series. For this reason, stochastic simulation has also been an important tool for analysis. McPhail and Babcock (2008) developed a PE model to simulate the outcomes for the US 2008/2009 corn market based on a set of stochastic shocks (including gasoline prices). They estimated that gasoline price volatility and corn price volatility are positively related; and, for example, gasoline price volatility of 25 per cent standard deviation (i.e. if prices are normally distributed, 68 per cent of the time the gasoline price will be within +25 per cent of the mean gasoline price) would lead to volatility in the corn price of 17.5 per cent standard deviation. Thompson, Meyer and Westhoff (2009) utilised a stochastic framework (based on the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) PE model of the US agricultural sector) and found that the implied elasticity of a change in oil price on US corn price, absent a binding RFS, is 0.31 (i.e. a 1 per cent increase in the price of oil leads to a 0.31 per cent increase in the corn price), whereas in the presence of the RFS this is reduced to 0.17. In subsequent work, Meyer and Thompson (2010) showed that the presence of tariffs and credits does not alter corn price volatility significantly. Yano, Blandford and Surry (2010) used Monte Carlo simulations of a PE model to show that the US RFS reduces the impact that variations in petroleum prices have on corn prices, while the impacts from variations in corn supply on corn prices are increased.
A final, important paper in this line of PE, stochastic simulation analyses is that of Gohin and Treguet (2010) who found that the introduction of biofuel policies destabilises corn prices by reducing the frequency with which farm policy instruments are binding.
Analytical framework
In the face of this flurry of econometric and simulation analysis, we believe that it is useful to develop an analytical framework that will help us to conceptualise the key linkages between agricultural and energy markets. Consider a simple, PE model with two related markets: a biofuel feedstock and liquid fuel. Biofuel is produced from the feedstock and mixed with diesel (or gasoline) to produce a blended liquid fuel. Using a set of standard assumptions, documented in the supplementary data at ERAE online, it is straightforward to show that the following equation holds in equilibrium. This links the percentage change in the price of the feedstock (p R ) to exogenous shocks to the price of liquid fuels (p F ), as well as random shocks to the net supply of the feedstock to the biofuel industry (△ RB ), 6 when biofuel mandates are not binding:
where h F represents the own price elasticity of demand for liquid fuel, s is the elasticity of substitution between diesel (gasoline) and biodiesel (ethanol) in the production function of blended liquid fuel, v RB reflects the net supply price elasticity of the feedstock to the biofuel industry, 7 finally u RB is the biofuel revenue-adjusted cost share of feedstock in the biofuel production process (i.e. the input cost share divided by the share of total revenue obtained from biofuel, as opposed to sales of by-products). The denominator in Equation (1) can be rewritten in terms of the feedstock supply and demand elasticities:
, where h RS and h RD are the constant elasticities of supply and demand, respectively, and b is the share of feedstock going to biofuel.
Based on Equation (1), we can see that a random shock to D RB will result in a larger change in the feedstock price, the more inelastic are feedstock supply and/or demand (as reflected by the n RB term in the denominator of Equation (1)), the smaller is s and the smaller is u RB .
The impact of random feedstock supply and demand shocks on feedstock price volatility in the face of an increase in the sales share of feedstock going to biofuel (b) depends critically on the relative sizes of the two feedstock demand sources. If the derived demand elasticity for feedstock from biofuel exceeds the price elasticity of non-biofuel demand for feedstock: u RB s . −h RD , then a rise in b will dampen the volatility of feedstock prices in response to a feedstock supply shock (see supplementary data at ERAE online for details). The same is true of exogenous shocks to feedstock demand. If the mandate for biofuel production were to be binding, such that changes in the price of biofuel did not affect demand, then the opposite would be true, namely an increased reliance of feedstock producers on biofuel markets would destabilise the feedstock price response to supply and demand shocks.
We are also interested in the impact of changes in market structure on the transmission of liquid fuel price variability into the feedstock price. Here the impact of b is unambiguous. A larger value for b results in a smaller denominator, and therefore, more volatile feedstock prices in response to fuel price shocks. More generally, an increase in global fuel prices will boost feedstock prices, in all but extreme cases wherein the elasticity of substitution between biofuel and petroleum (s . 0) is dominated by the price elasticity of aggregate demand for liquid fuels (h F , 0). (Given the relatively inelastic demand for liquid fuels for transportation, this seems unlikely.) The magnitude of this feedstock price change will be larger the more inelastic are feedstock supply and demand, the larger the share of feedstock going to biofuel (b), and the smaller the revenue-weighted cost share of feedstock in biofuel production ( u RB ).
This picture is further complicated by the proliferation of the US feedstockspecific RFS. This style of mandate has important implications for commodity market volatility, since, within a given year, when oil prices are low such that the RFS is binding, the total sales of feedstock to the biofuel market is predetermined so that the only price-responsive portion of feedstock demand is the non-biofuel component. In this case, the equilibrium change in feedstock price simplifies to the following:
Note that the price of liquid fuel does not appear in this expression at all, since the RFS fixes the demand for biofuel in total fuel use. The second point to note is that the responsiveness of feedstock prices to random shocks in the feedstock market is now magnified by the absence of the substitution-related term ( u RB s) in the denominator of Equation (2). The EU RED mandate is specified as a share of total liquid fuel use. In terms of the equilibrium solution under a binding mandate, this means that q RB = q F = h F p F , i.e. the percentage change in the supply of feedstock in biofuel production (q RB ), equates to the percentage change in the demand for liquid fuels (q F ), which is a function of price and the corresponding elasticity. This re-introduces a link between fuel prices and feedstock prices when the mandate is binding. Specifically,
Since the fuel demand elasticity is negative, the impact of a rise in fuel prices is now opposite of before -namely it serves to depress the demand for the feedstock, and thereby lower feedstock prices. In addition to this important difference, the EU mandate is not tied to a specific feedstock so that if there is a feedstock shortfall in one year, the mandate can be met through an increased use of other feedstocks. As we will see in the empirical example below, this offers an important source of flexibility for fuel producers in the EU, serving to moderate the volatility-increasing nature of a binding mandate. Indeed, this simplification alone is a justification for moving to a full-blown empirical framework for analysis. The foregoing PE model has abstracted from the role of energy input costs in feedstock and biofuel production. We have also abstracted from international trade, which has become an increasingly important dimension of the biofuel markets. For all these reasons, the empirical model introduced in the next section is more complex than that laid out above. Nonetheless, we will see that the insights provided in this section are quite useful in aiding the interpretation of our empirical results.
Empirical framework
Given the complex links and interactions between food, feed and fuel sectors, competition among these sectors for limited economic resources, as well as interactions between the production, consumption and trade activities, an economy-wide computational general equilibrium (CGE) modelling approach provides an appropriate framework to analyse the impacts of the biofuel targets. The value of a global CGE approach in analysing the impacts of biofuel mandates has previously been demonstrated in the work of several researchers (e.g. Reilly and Paltsev, 2007; Keeney and Hertel, 2009; Gohin and Chantret, 2010; Hertel, Tyner and Birur, 2010; Taheripour, Hertel and Tyner, 2010a; Taheripour et al., 2010b) .
One major complaint about CGE models is model validation. Several authors have recently addressed this issue using variants of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model to examine the potential for the model to reproduce historical price volatility in commodity markets and thereby identify model improvements. Valenzuela et al. (2007) do so in the case of wheat, and Beckman, Hertel and Tyner (2011) do so in the case of petroleum. Hertel and Beckman (2010) have recently examined the GTAP-BIO model's ability to reproduce observed price volatility in the global corn market in the pre-biofuels era (up to 2001) and the recent biofuel era (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . They find that the model does reasonably well in reproducing the observed price volatility, and they note that most of the volatility in commodity markets in the pre-biofuel era can be attributable to supply-side production impacts. Once the ethanol industry began utilising a large share of US corn supply; energy price volatility became increasingly important. On this basis, we use the most recent version of the GTAP-BIO model (Taheripour, Hertel and Tyner, 2010a; Taheripour et al., 2010b) which features a detailed treatment of the oilseeds complex, a critical component to this work.
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is important to note that the model used here is a simple, static one, intended to highlight the importance of price transmission in the biofuels era. As such, it cannot take into account some of the key mechanisms, such as commodity storage and futures markets, that have evolved to limit price volatility, nor does our model account for risk aversion on the part of economic agents as has been introduced by Gohin and Treguet (2010) .
Experimental design

Historical update
The GTAP-BIO database is benchmarked to 2001; therefore, we first undertake a historical simulation following Tyner et al. (2010) and Beckman, Hertel and Tyner (2011) to update our database (to 2006). Those authors show that by shocking population, labour supply, capital, investment and productivity changes, 8 along with the relevant energy price shocks, it is possible to produce an updated global database that represents a reasonable approximation to key features of this more recent economy. The 2006 database forms the starting point for our subsequent simulations and analysis. An overview of the experimental design is provided in Figure 1 .
Projections to 2020
The USA has mandated that 56.8 billion litres of ethanol and 3.8 billion litres of biodiesel should be produced by 2015. We considered these figures as the US targets for 2020 as well. In the EU, the mandate is formulated as a share of biofuels in total transportation fuels. We follow Al-Riffai et al. (2010) in setting this share at 5.6 per cent in the year 2020. We assume that 55 per cent of EU biofuels will be derived from ethanol and 45 per cent will be from biodiesel in 2020, again, following Al-Riffai et al. (2010) .
9 Unlike the 2001-2006, historical simulation, we do not run a full update experiment to 2020, as we do not know how key exogenous variables will evolve over this future period. Therefore, we choose to focus only on updating the biofuel economy and associated elements of the farm, food and energy system. 10 We boost consumption of biofuels to their mandated levels via a combination of policy instruments, designed to mimic government mandates, in the following way. We subsidise the renewable fuel to encourage an increased use, relative to petroleum products. To avoid the misleading outcome of falling liquid fuel prices, we then tax firms by an amount precisely equal to the renewable fuel subsidy. Since firms are deviating from their cost minimising mixture of fuel inputs, this will result in higher costs which are ultimately passed on to consumers in the form of higher fuel prices.
Base case analysis
Having established a 2020 agricultural-biofuel economy, we first seek to better understand how potential changes in the relative importance of biofuels over the period from 2006 to 2020 are likely to alter the responsiveness of commodity prices to uncertainty in agricultural and energy markets. We do this by contrasting the volatility of agricultural prices to supply, demand and energy price shocks in the context of the 2006 and 2020 economies. For this purpose, the distribution of the stochastic shocks (as a proportion 8 The shocks are listed in Tyner et al. (2010) . 9 They note the same thing that we will, and that these assumptions are crucial for any analysis.
The 5.6 per cent biofuel figure is based on the figure derived from the PRIMES model used by the EU Commission (DG AGRI). The 55/45 ethanol/biodiesel percentages are also based on the PRIMES model. One point of caution on this ratio is that the current split is 20/80, and that Member States in the Member State National Renewable Energy Action Plans predict a ratio of 25/75 by 2020 (ICCT, 2010). 10 We could use projections of key variables, but they would be uncertain, and we do not believe that this would significantly alter our findings, which hinge primarily on quantity and cost shares.
of the underlying supply and demand variables) will be unchanged. For this initial exercise, we abstract from potentially binding quantitative biofuel targets; thus biofuel quantities are free to react to price movements and this Base Case permits us to identify the pure effect of the increased importance of biofuels as in total agricultural sales.
The role of quantitative biofuel targets in 2020
The preceding experiments set the stage for an in-depth exploration of the role of quantitative biofuel target policies in governing the linkages between agricultural and energy markets and the extent of agricultural price volatility. For this, we turn to alternative policy scenarios that could fundamentally alter the nature of these linkages when compared with the base case. In the case of US mandates, the RFS provides a lower bound on biofuel production levels and may be represented via the following complementary slackness conditions where S is the subsidy required to induce additional use of biofuel (there is a separate set of conditions for ethanol and biodiesel), and QR is the ratio of observed biofuel use to the quota as specified under the mandate:
S ≥ 0⊥, (QR mandate − 1) ≥ 0 which implies that either S . 0, (QR mandate − 1) = 0 mandate is binding or S = 0, (QR mandate − 1) ≥ 0 mandate is non-binding
Since producers do not actually receive a subsidy for meeting the RFS, the additional cost of producing liquid fuels must be passed forward to the consumer.
A key point about the RFS is that it is asymmetric. Thus, when the RFS is just binding (S = 0, (QR mandate − 1) = 0), any rise in the price of gasoline (diesel) will increase ethanol (biodiesel) production past the mandated amount, since ethanol (biodiesel) is now better able to compete with gasoline (diesel) on an energy basis. In this case, feedstock demand (and price) will be responsive to changes in the oil price. In contrast, a decrease in the price of gasoline (diesel) does nothing to ethanol (biodiesel) production; i.e. it stays at the mandated amount. S . 0 ensures that ethanol (biodiesel) continues to be used at current levels. Since it is very difficult to predict whether the RFS will be binding in 2020, and if so, how severely binding it will be, we adopt the simple assumption that the RFS is just barely binding in the initial equilibrium. Therefore, any rise in oil prices will translate through to biofuel prices.
As noted previously, the EU RED mandate functions differently from the US RFS. First, the target is expressed in terms of a share of biofuels in total fuel consumption. Therefore, if oil prices rise, such that total fuel consumption falls, then the targeted level of biofuels also falls. This means that QR mandate in Equation (4) is now the ratio of two shares. In the numerator is the observed biofuel share in liquid fuel use and in the denominator we have the targeted share (5.6 per cent in the case of the EU 2020 target). A second point is that there is only one such condition in the EU; that is, this is a target for all biofuels -it is not feedstock-specific. As with the US RFS, we will make the assumption in our policy simulations that the EU RED is just barely binding when we initiate the stochastic simulations.
We turn now to a discussion of the stochastic shocks which will be sampled from distributions of supply side shocks in agriculture and energy markets, as well as economy-wide demand shocks.
Characterising sources of volatility in energy and agricultural markets
The distributions of the stochastic shocks to corn production, oilseed production, wheat 11 production, aggregate demand and oil prices are assumed to be normally and independently distributed.
12 Given the great many uses of commodities in the global economy, we prefer to shock the underlying determinant of demand, namely gross domestic product (GDP), allowing the GDP shocks to vary by model region.
To characterise the systematic component in feedstock production, timesseries models are fitted to Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) data on annual production over the time period of 1981-2006. For oil prices, we use Energy Information Administration data on US average price and average import price (we take a simple average of the two series) over the same time periods. Time series on GDP are sourced from the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund.
The key results of interest from the time-series regressions on both the supply and demand sides are the normalised standard deviations of the estimated residuals, reported in Table 2 . 13 This result summarises the variability of the non-systematic aspect of annual feedstock production, oil price and GDP in each region for the 1981-2006 time period. (We do not attempt to estimate region-specific variances for oil prices as we assume this to be a wellintegrated market with a single-global price.) The statistic reported in Table 2 is calculated as: variance √ (of estimated residuals) divided by the mean value of production (or prices, or GDP), and multiplied by 100.
Results
Results for 2006: model validation and decomposition of shocks
As discussed previously, we update the database to 2006 to provide a reasonably current representation of the global economy in the context of the biofuel era; we then undertake a stochastic simulation for the 2006 economy (where biofuel mandates are not implemented, i.e. biofuel sectors are free to respond to the simulations). Comparing the model-generated commodity price variation reported in the first column of Table 3 , model estimated, the inter-annual US coarse grain price changes exhibits a standard deviation of 25.8 per cent compared with the observed standard deviation of 25.5 per cent. In the case of oilseeds in the EU, the two estimates are 22.4 per cent (model) and 21.1 per cent (observed), respectively. The model does not do as well in capturing historical variability in wheat (both regions) and EU coarse grains. This may be due to the fact that we have computed EU historical price volatility based on individual countries deemed 'representative' of the EU as a whole (France for coarse grains and wheat, and Germany for oilseeds). In the case of wheat, the estimated export demand elasticities are much larger than for coarse grains and oilseeds . It is possible that these cross-section econometric estimates are too large for accurate representation of time series interannual price variability. Although our focus is on price volatility, production volatility for the USA and the EU is also presented in Table 3 as a further test of the model. For the USA, the model does not do as well in reproducing coarse grains production volatility (compared with price volatility); however, the model is fairly close for oilseeds. The EU model-estimated volatility is slightly higher than the historical outcome across all commodities. We conclude that model estimates of Note: Historical outcome price and production variation was computed from FAO producer prices and production. For the EU, France was the largest and thus, the representative region for coarse grains and wheat feedstocks; while Germany was the region for oilseeds. Parentheses represent the share of volatility for oil price/feedstock production inputs in total volatility.
production volatility are sufficient (as we would expect since are providing the model with stochastic production estimates); and note that the gap in US coarse grains is likely attributable to changes in yields that the model did not capture. Table 3 also reports separate results for stochastic simulations wherein the sole source of volatility is either oil prices (second column) and/or supply shocks for the particular commodity in question (third column). Not surprisingly, supply-side shocks dominate the overall volatility story, whereas the role of oil price volatility in agricultural commodity markets in 2006 is relatively modest.
Results for 2020
No mandates
As per the experimental design, the model is next updated to 2020 by imposing that the USA and the EU meet their first-generation biofuel mandate targets. We begin the 2020 experiment by considering the hypothetical case in which biofuel mandates are inactive going forward from 2020; thus marginal changes in biofuel use respond only to market forces. In effect, this is a 'counterfactual' set of simulations in order to deduce the impact of the mandates on market volatility. Contrasting this with the previous 2006 results serves to illustrate how the changing importance of biofuels in the economy alters the transmission of supply and demand shocks between the agricultural and energy economies.
Results in the left panel of Table 4 indicate that, in the absence of any role for the mandates, energy price shocks contribute much more to commodity price variation in 2020. Indeed, oil price shocks now contribute to a standard deviation of 15.5 for US coarse grain price, which amounts to more than half of total variation in coarse grain prices (but still less than the independent variation induced by coarse grains supply side shocks -since the combined impact of these independent shocks is not additive). This result has been anticipated by our PE analysis, since a larger share of corn is going to ethanol production in 2020. In addition, ethanol production is free to respond to low and high oil price draws from the stochastic simulations, since the RFS is non-binding. The US wheat and oilseed price variation is also more heavily influenced by oil price volatility in 2020, with this amounting to shares of 0.45 and 0.49 of the total variation in wheat and oilseeds prices, respectively.
In the 2020 database, the EU has large amounts of biofuels produced from both wheat and oilseeds; and as we saw with the USA, oil price volatility plays an increasingly important role in feedstock commodity price variation. EU wheat, in particular, is influenced by oil price volatility as the standard deviation of year-on-year price changes increases from 2.1 to 7.9, even as the independent variation induced by supply-side shocks is nearly unchanged in importance. The oilseeds market in the EU is also increasingly influenced by oil price volatility.
The bottom panel of Table 4 reports world average crop price volatility in the model. Here, we see that the relative importance of oil price volatility for global commodity market volatility is two to three times as large in 2020. For example, whereas the impact of oil price shocks alone amounted to just 17 per cent of global coarse grains volatility in 2006, this figure rises to 45 per cent in 2020. However, the overall increase in coarse grains volatility from 2006 to 2020 is relatively small, since the oil price shocks are uncorrelated with the supply-side shocks.
Mandate impacts
Starting from the 2020 database, we now explore the implications of introducing biofuel mandates in the context of these uncertain commodity markets. As noted previously, we now assume that, in the initial 2020 equilibrium, the mandates are just binding, such that an increased supply of feedstock will cause the mandate to become non-binding, whereas a feedstock shortage (with subsequent cost increases for biofuels) will tighten the mandate constraint.
The results in the right-hand side of Table 4 indicate that, relative to the no policy case, energy price shocks contribute less to commodity price variation in the case of mandates. For example, oil price shocks now induce a change in US coarse grains price variation of 8.7, compared with 15.5 when no policies were implemented. In the case of an energy price decline, which would normally be expected to reduce the feedstock commodity price, there is no longer an impact on feedstock prices when the US RFS is binding (recall Equation (2)). On the other hand, when oil prices rise, the demand for biofuels is Structural change in the biofuels era 151 lifted off that constraint. Therefore, it is little surprise that the oil price contribution to commodity price volatility is roughly cut in half when the justbinding RFS is imposed in the context of our stochastic simulation. As previously discussed, EU mandates operate differently than those in the USA. Rather than simply eliminating the linkage between oil prices and feedstock prices, this policy actually reverses the sign of the effect that oil prices have on the feedstock price. Here the effect of a higher oil price is to reduce aggregate fuel consumption and therefore reduce biofuel requirements as per the PE model results.
14 This reversal tends to moderate the overall impact of oil price volatility on feedstocks, which we see from the simulation results in Table 4 . In that table, with the feedstock-generic, biofuel share fuel standard, the influence of oil prices volatility on commodity prices is rather modest.
As noted in the PE analysis, the importance of supply-side shocks on agricultural commodity prices is heightened in the presence of a binding mandate. In the case of the US mandate, such binding altogether removes the price responsiveness of biofuel demand from the marketplace. This absence translates into a sharp magnification of the responsiveness of agricultural commodity prices to random shocks to agricultural commodity supplies and non-biofuel demand -lifting the own-production contribution to coarse grains volatility from 23.6 to 29.1 per cent. Supply-side shocks for EU agricultural commodities are still important; however, there is not as great a difference with the no-mandate case as there is for the USA. This suggests that the difference between the USA and EU is due to differences in the nature of the stochastic shocks as well as the policies and structure of the energy and commodity markets in these two regions.
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The world price results at the bottom of Table 4 show that, while oil price volatility plays less of a role in total commodity price volatility under the mandate scenario, the overall world commodity price volatility rises. This is due to the more inelastic commodity demand, and hence the greater price volatility in the face of supply-side shocks -particularly in the USA and EU where the mandates are initially just binding.
As a means of further comparing the effects of a mandate, Figure 2 presents the simulated price distribution for a biofuel feedstock (wheat) in the EU (results are similar for other commodities). When there is no mandate (dark bars), the percentage change in the wheat market price is relatively symmetric, albeit somewhat skewed to the positive side due to the CES demand functions (indifference curves asymptotic to the axis, such that some consumption persists, even at very high prices).
When the mandate is introduced into the 2020 database, low levels of demand and/or low oil prices no longer result in a decline in demand for biofuel feedstocks, as the mandate becomes binding. This truncates the lower tail of the price distribution, which shifts to the right and becomes less symmetric than in the no-mandate case.
Discussion
The combination of recent high (and volatile) energy prices and policies aimed at promoting energy security and renewable fuel use has stimulated the use of crop feedstocks in biofuel production. The small, but increasing, share of biofuels in transportation fuels; and the large amount of agricultural commodities dedicated to producing energy has altered the agricultural landscape, strengthening the relationship between agricultural and energy commodity markets. With ambitious mandates to further increase in biofuel production in the USA and EU, it is clear that further changes are in store for the future. Results presented here indicate that, abstracting from the presence of binding mandates, larger sales of farm products as biofuel feedstocks production will continue to strengthen the transmission of energy price volatility into agricultural commodity price variation. Indeed, the role of such volatility is estimated to be more than double for most US and EU crops between 2006 and 2020. This new source of relatively elastic demand also serves to moderate the sensitivity of commodity prices to supply-side shocks -in the absence of binding mandates.
However, in the presence of binding mandates, the picture changes considerably. Having removed the scope for reduced feedstock sales in the face of falling oil prices, or rising commodity prices, agricultural price volatility rises. Indeed, the sensitivity of commodity prices to supply-side shocks increases sharply. The extent of such increases is likely understated in our results, which assume that the mandates are only just binding. If the mandates in 2020 are strongly binding, this result would be even sharper. Another factor that would affect our results is the presence of producer risk aversion. As shown by Gohin and Treguet (2010) , incorporation of producers' endogenous response to risk alters supply response in the context of biofuels policy. Incorporating this more realistic feature represents an important extension of the current work.
In this paper, we contrast the impacts of a quantitative biofuel target policy in the USA and the EU. A fuel source-specific biofuel policy, similar to the US RFS, hinders the biofuels' sectors ability to react to low oil prices, thereby destabilising agricultural commodity markets but reducing the transmission of energy price volatility on agricultural commodity prices. In the EU, the presence of binding biofuels mandates, based on a share of total fuel use, also reduces the impact of energy prices on agricultural commodities; however, the effect is more modest, as falling oil prices boost liquid fuel consumption, thereby bolstering the demand for biofuels. There is also scope for substitution amongst feedstocks.
Comparing all the scenarios considered here, the absence of all biofuel policies leads to the highest transmission of energy price volatility into agricultural commodity price variation and the lowest agricultural commodity price volatility in response to traditional supply-side shocks. This is because consumers are able to respond to both high and low oil prices by changing their biofuel mixture; and adjustment to agricultural commodity supply shocks are absorbed by energy and non-energy markets alike. When we implement quantitative biofuels policies, the impacts from energy price volatility are smaller than the base case, while the impacts from agricultural commodity supply volatility are magnified. In summary, it seems likely we will experience a future in which agricultural price volatility -particularly for biofuel feedstocks -will rise. The extent of this volatility will depend critically on renewable energy policies. Indeed, in the future, these sources of uncertainty may become more important than traditional agricultural policies in many farm commodity markets.
As mentioned earlier, the US RFS specifies an even larger amount of biofuels to be derived from advanced biofuels by 2022. Because of the uncertain future of this portion of the mandate, we choose to focus this work squarely on the current-feasible biofuels technology. Once feasible technology costs for advanced biofuels are developed, a similar line of research should be developed since the advanced biofuel portion of the RFS exceeds the amount of ethanol from the corn portion. Although advanced biofuels can be derived from crop and forestry residues, and some of the cellulosic feedstocks can be grown on marginal lands, the sheer amount of land that must be allocated to meet the mandate suggests that this will likely influence agricultural commodity markets in important ways that deserve further investigation.
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